Why Air Chief Marshal AP Singh should be the next Marshal of the Air Force
- Jayant Chakravarti
- Jun 10
- 16 min read
Updated: Jul 11
On June 5, Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh, the Indian Air Force chief, concluded a three-day official visit to France. During his visit, he performed customary handshakes with the French Chief of Staff of the Air and Space Force and the Chief of the Military Staff to the President.
But the most defining moments of the Air Chief Marshal's French sojourn were his meetings with the leaders of Dassault Aviation, Thales, Safran, and MBDA, four major French defence and aerospace giants that together manufacture and power the Rafale multi-role strike aircraft, 36 of which were procured by the Indian Air Force back in 2016.
Singh visit was significant as only four months ago, the Indian government's Defence Acquisition Council had granted Acceptance of Necessity for the procurement of 114 Rafale aircraft from France. A fortnight before he left for France, the Indian Air Force had also finalised the request for proposal for the multi-billion dollar acquisition.
But unlike the emergency procurement of 36 Rafale aircraft in 2016, the new deal requires the aviation giant to partner with an Indian company to manufacture up to 94 of the 114 jets in India.
What makes the new deal a shot in the arm for India is that it proposes significant transfer of technology of significant proprietary technologies, and Singh has minced no words in stating the benefits of having such critical technologies to reduce dependence on overseas companies for spares, supplies, modifications, repairs, overhauls and adding more firepower to the fighter fleet.
While Dassault Aviation manufactures the aircraft, Safran supplies the engines, Thales provides the core electronic systems, sensors, and avionics and MBDA provides primary weapon systems, electronic warfare kits, BVR missiles, and a range of armaments. Singh's meetings with these companies pointed at figuring out how they would ensure domestic manufacturing in India and transfer critical technologies to achieve at least 50% localisation in the long term.
The Air Chief Marshal also flew aboard an Airbus A400M Atlas military transport aircraft, one of the prominent competitors of the IAF's planned acquisition of 60 medium transport aircraft. The aircraft will compete with Lockheed Martin's C-130J-30 Super Hercules and Embraer's C-390 Millennium aircraft and the winner will replace the aging fleet of Antonov AN-32 and Il-76 transport aircraft.
Two months before his trip to France, Singh also made a week-long trip to the United States, meeting top USAF officials as well as top executives of GE Aerospace which has been failing to supply GE-F414 engines to the HAL to power Tejas Mk-1A aircraft.
The visits highlighted the chief's efforts to put together different pieces of strategic acquisition puzzles before he retires at the end of September. Prominent on his list of priorities have been the acquisition of 114 Rafale jets, prototyping of the domestic Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft, ensuring faster induction of military systems, and enhancing indigenous design, development, and production of systems to ensure strategic self-reliance.
Unlike many military leaders who prefer to keep their cards close to their chests, Singh has been candidly outspoken about the many setbacks that have delayed progress on these programmes.
The HAL fiasco
He was at his candid best when he aired his frustration, very publicly, at the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited's inability to manufacture Tejas Mk-1A jets in time as the Air Force struggled to preserve its fighter strength as the years went by. For the IAF, it became expensive and difficult to maintain and repair older varieties of fighter jets acquired in the 1980s as it waited and waited for the new jets to arrive and spare parts became difficult to obtain.
The Air Chief Marshal's rant took place at Aero India 2025 in Bengaluru with him seated in the cockpit of an HJT-36 Yashas, a prototype intermediate jet trainer, and senior HAL officials perched on the ladder next to him.
"I was promised that when I come here in February, 11 Tejas Mk-1As would be ready. And not a single one is ready," the exasperated chief said. "The aircraft that you flew, calling it Mk-1A, is not Mk-1A. It cannot happen just by change of one software or by looks. When the weapons come and the capability comes, then it’s a Mk-1A."
"HAL is our company, we have all worked there. But I find that HAL is just not in mission mode," he continued. "I can only tell you what our requirements and our worries are. You have to alleviate those worries and make us more confident. At the moment I am just not confident of HAL, which is a very wrong thing to happen."
For a long time, the government-owned aviation company sought to shift the blame on GE Aviation for not delivering jet engines on time, but Singh knew the issue wasn't logistical, but a lack of intent and capability.
The first signs of trouble had surfaced during the prototyping stage. Taking a leap of faith following the severely delayed induction of the first batch of 40 Tejas Mk1 aircraft, the government of India signed a contract with HAL for the delivery of 83 Tejas Mk 1A jets, including 10 trainers, in February 2021.
At the time, HAL promised that it would deliver three jets by early 2024 and 16 jets every year for the next five years. Aside from charging over ₹45,600 crore for the 83 jets, HAL charged the government another ₹1,200 crore for design and development and to set up infrastructure to manufacture the Tejas Mk-1A jets.
The first Tejas Mk-1A production series aircraft took the skies for the first time on March 28, 2024, and by 2025, a second production facility in Nashik began producing the jets with HAL using reserve engines to test fly the jets in the absence of new engines from GE Aviation. The delivery schedule was beginning to go off the tracks.
By April 2026, GE Aviation supplied six F404-IN20 engines to HAL, yet not a single Tejas Mk-1A has been accepted by the IAF till date. It soon appeared that the delay in engine supplies was a cause for concern, but HAL was far from developing the 4.5 generation multi-role fighter aircraft it had promised to the IAF.
Singh had publicly rebuked HAL officials at Aero India 2025, but in June that year, he doubled down on his conviction that the HAL had promised a lot more than it could deliver.
"Many times, we know while signing contracts that those systems will never come. Timelines are a big issue. Not a single project I can think of is completed on time," he said at the Confederation of Indian Industry's Annual Business Summit. "Why should we promise something which cannot be achieved?"
Singh's growing frustrations stemmed from HAL's inability to adequately integrate the fighter jet's mission computer, electronic warfare suite and weapon firing controls. Integrating these systems and technologies required significant validation testing and certifications, something the IAF could not afford to wait for and certainly could not trust HAL's promises of fixing the issues within months.
HAL has accepted the technical challenges it faces to make the aircraft ready for operational deployment, but continues to shift the dates when it will be ready for delivery to the IAF. At present, the manufacturer has slated the delivery of the first batch of fighter jets to the IAF in the August to September 2026 window.
In February, the manufacturer announced that five Tejas Mk-1A jets were "fully ready" to be delivered, quietly placing the ball in the IAF's court, but also revealed that "all design and development issues identified are being addressed in an expedited manner." The two contrary statements sought to placate investors on one hand and validated the concerns of the Air Chief Marshal on the other.
The reason why the five Tejas Mk-1A jets are still parked at HAL's garage is Singh's absolute refusal to accept a compromised and inadequate fighter jet. HAL had played the game before, forcing the IAF to absorb dozens of Tejas Mk1 jets a decade ago that did not meet the operator's minimum acceptable requirements. Facing a worsening shortage of fighter squadrons, the IAF had to absorb 16 Initial Operational Clearance fighters, 18 Final Operational Clearance fighters, and six trainers. Interestingly, HAL is yet to deliver two trainer jets from the older contract.
Singh has reason to be worried, as this is just the beginning of the troubles. It isn't guaranteed that the IAF will receive fully-ready Tejas Mk-1A jets in 2026, and the government signed another deal with HAL in September 2025 to procure another 97 fighters.
What the IAF needs is a true 4.5-generation fighter aircraft to plug capability gaps before the AMCA becomes a reality. HAL promised to built Tejas Mk2 to fulfill the requirement, supplying Mk-1A jets in vast numbers to shore up squadron strength in the short term. Cut to June 2026, none of the 180 Mk-1A jets are with the IAF and HAL is yet to roll out its first prototype of the Mk2 aircraft.
The AMCA programme
When chiding HAL's for its many failures at CII's summit, Singh delivered his vision that was going to entirely change the course of the aviation industry. "Can't that industry or some of the industry join together and say we will make world-class military equipment? This is your tap on the shoulder. Please rise to the occasion," he told industry leaders. The Air Chief Marshal had just signalled the private sector's entry into the sphere of fighter jet manufacturing.
And he walked the talk. A day before he laid the challenge to the private sector, he got the Defence Minister to approve the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft Programme Execution Model - a challenge to the private sector to work with the Aeronautical Development Agency to design and manufacture prototypes of India's first fifth generation fighter aircraft. This was a multi-billion dollar opportunity ripe for the taking, and HAL had been kept out of the race.
In less than a year, the Ministry of Defence issued a ₹15,000 crore Request for Proposal for the development and manufacturing of prototypes of the AMCA. The Ministry invited three private players - Tata Advanced Systems, a consortium of Larsen and Toubro and Bharat Electronics Limited, and another consortium of Bharat Forge and Bharat Earth Movers Limited - to bid for the project.
The process of submission of the bids and final selection of the winner is slated to take less than six months, but this isn't an achievement the Air chief is proud of. At the CII Summit, a day after the Defence Minister formally kicked off the AMCA programme, he lamented that a prototype of the AMCA wasn't ready yet.
Singh, however, committing to placing his trust on the private sector but warned that the trust could not be taken for granted as it could impact national security. "We need to have trust between the forces and industry. We need to be very open. Once we have committed to something, we should deliver. Air Force is trying to do its best to make in India," he said. "We have to be now-ready to be future-ready. What we need today, we need today. We need to quickly get our act together. Wars are won by empowering our forces."
Laying Mig-21s to rest
Singh's determination to modernise the IAF's fighter fleet made him do what many of his predecessors couldn't - retiring India's first supersonic fighter jets at the risk of depleting squadron numbers. Despite not receiving new jets from HAL, he number plated the last two Mig-21 squadrons, being the last to fly one of the vintage birds for good measure.
Since the turn of the millennium, the Mig-21s were no longer the air dominance interceptors they once were, with multi-role Sukhoi 30MKI fighters taking over the mantle as the IAF's premier strike force. The IAF planned to retire Mig-21s long ago by acquiring 126 modern fighters under a 2008 MRFA programme, but shortage of funds and soaring costs ensured that the IAF had to keep the vintage birds flying to preserve its squadron numbers.
That argument didn't sit well with Singh. "It's an amazing aircraft to fly, very agile and manoeuvrable. But everything has a time and place," he said following his last Mig-21 sortie. "The technology is outdated and difficult to maintain now. It's time to move on to newer platforms like Tejas, Rafales and Sukhoi-30s."
By retiring the Migs, Singh freed up trained personnel, pilots and engineers to deploy them at modern squadrons that needed the experience, plus a lot of money. Had the Air Force retired the Migs earlier, perhaps Squadron Leader (now Group Captain) Abhinandan Varthaman would have piloted a more capable fighter jet to take down a formation of Pakistani F-16s that had crossed Indian air space a day after the airstrike on Balakot.
Testing the trainers
With the IAF pivoting to fifth generation fighter aircraft to keep pace with the rest of the world, the focus is very much on the quality of trainer aircraft to prepare young pilots joining the force for the next generation of aerial warfare.
IAF presently runs a three-stage pilot training programme. In the first stage, rookie pilots fly the Pilatus PC-7 Mk II basic trainer aircraft to learn fundamental flying skills. In the second stage, these pilots start flying the HJT-16 Kiran intermediate trainer jet to develop advanced flight handling skills and other capabilities like flying in formation, conducting aerobatics, learning how to handle instruments, navigating the aircraft, and mastering high speed flight.
In the third and final stage of training, young pilots fly the BAE Hawk Mk 132 jet aircraft, getting exposed to advanced instrumentation, avionics, flight handling controls and supersonic operations that mirror those of fighter jets in service with the IAF.
At present, the trainer fleet is suffering from severe obsolescence and operational issues that have persisted for decades. The HJT-16 Kiran intermediate trainer jet, which first flew in 1964 and the last of which was manufactured in 1989, is an obsolete aircraft slated for retirement by the IAF but continues to serve due to the absence of replacement jets.
Similarly, the fleet of 75 Pilatus PC-7 basic trainers have been facing operational issues, specially since 2018 when the manufacturer warranty expired and there was no Follow on Service Contract signed with Pilatus during the induction stage. The IAF has plans to replace these aircraft with HAL's new HTT-40 turboprop basic trainers and also to grow its fleet of basic trainers to 181.
During AP Singh's tenure at the Air chief, the IAF has made significant progress to replace or modernise existing trainer aircraft in a phased manner, and the chief's contribution towards the progress cannot be understated. The government of India signed a ₹6,838-crore contract with HAL to procure 70 HTT-40 trainers when he was the vice chief, with deliveries to begin in 2026. However, as is usual with HAL contracts, the first deliveries will not begin until 2027 due to delays in engine supplies by Honeywell.
The bigger fish to fry was the need to replace HJT-16 Kiran intermediate trainer jets which had been around for more than 60 years. The available replacement is HAL's HJT-36 Yashas - an intermediate trainer featuring modern avionics, a full glass cockpit, and five weapon hardpoints. Initially named Sitara, prototypes of the aircraft first flew in 2003, but the IAF is yet to order the jet in significant numbers.
HAL's inability to meet the force's strict requirements for an intermediate trainer aircraft made the project lag for over two decades. The IAF ordered 73 trainers in 2011 in a ₹6,180 crore deal, but not a single trainer could be made available for induction in the next ten years. The first prototype crashed in 2011, and newer prototypes failed to demonstrate required stall characteristics. To make things worse, the aircraft deviated from controlled flight when performing spin tests, an issue that HAL found hard to correct despite years of design modifications.
The HJT-36 got a new lease of life in early 2021 when it demonstrated six turn spins to both the left and right hand sides, but was still years away from achieving critical certifications and the IAF's FOC, the final hurdle before inductions began.
At Aero India 2025, HAL renamed the aircraft "Yashas" to mark a break from the previous iteration whose limitations had created a major void with the IAF which had been waiting for an intermediate trainer for fifteen years. On the cockpit was Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, who had used the occasion earlier to lambast HAL officials for failing to produce Tejas Mk1A jets in sufficient numbers.
Singh performed a 35-minute sortie aboard the Yashas, monitoring the aircraft's flight parameters and evaluating its stall and spin characteristics that had plagued the programme for years. The test flight ended with much fanfare with HAL officials jostling around the chief for pictures, but the battle hadn't been won yet.
Singh didn't say much about his flight aboard the Yashas, but indicated that the IAF would like to lease four prototypes to evaluate its stated credentials before placing an order. His stance mirrored his absolute refusal to induct Tejas Mk1A jets before they were ready, and the Army and IAF's inclination towards leasing prototypes of the Light Utility Helicopter before placing orders for 171 helicopters to replace the Cheetah and Chetak fleets.
The day of reckoning
If Aero India was a litmus test of the Air chief's dogged perseverance despite a critical shortage of fighter and trainer squadrons, his ability to muster the best of his forces to devastate the enemy's strongholds was tested during Operation Sindoor, a large-scale military operation in response to a dastardly terrorist attack in Kashmir's Pahalgam region on April 22.
The religiously-motivated terror attack inflamed passions and a desire for revenge so strong across the country that the military's response had to be decisive, overwhelming and precise, regardless of whether Pakistan went nuclear or not. The response finally came on May 7, and the IAF and the army struck and destroyed nine terrorist headquarters and bases, some located deep inside Pakistan.
The genius of how the armed forces executed Operation Sindoor was not defined just by the shock-and-awe strikes of May 7, but by how the IAF used precise intelligence and technological assets to strike high-value targets in its second wave of attacks on May 9, and the way it ensured that the airstrikes brought a quick end to the conflict.
The first wave of strikes only targeted the infrastructure of Pakistani terrorist networks, but after the PAF got involved, attempted to strike Indian military positions and launched a concerted drone war, IAF chose to demonstrate its overwhelming dominance by striking 11 out of 13 major enemy air bases in a high-intensity operation that lasted 90 minutes.
In those 90 minutes, IAF jets fired Brahmos, Rampage, Scalp, Crystal Maze, and Hammer missiles and guided bombs and a variety of loitering munitions to destroy strategic command centres, expensive radar sites, runways and parked aircraft at important air bases like Sargodha, Rahimyar Khan, Nur Khan in Rawalpindi, Murid, Shahbaz, Rafiqui, Sukkur and Bholari air force bases. The Pakistani army called for a ceasefire hours after the coordinated airstrikes severely crippled the PAF.
"This war had a clear objective and was concluded swiftly," Air Chief Marshal Singh said afterwards. "We acted decisively, unlike ongoing global conflicts, showing the world the value of terminating hostilities once objectives are met."
The Air chief's clear-headed approach prior to the strikes on the night of May 9 made the difference. Amid a raging air war and a drone offensive launched by the Pakistan Army, he wasn't just leading defensive anti-drone operations all along the border, but planned the systematic destruction of Pakistani radar systems and multiple aircraft, including a Saab 2000 Erieye Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft, enabling fighter formations to mount operations virtually unchallenged on the night of May 9 and the morning of May 10. Another AWACS aircraft was destroyed in Karachi's Bholari air base in these attacks.
Perhaps the most telling impact during the second wave of airstrikes was twin Brahmos missile strikes on Kirana Hills close to the premier PAF air base in Sargodha. The location served as the Pakistani military's primary nuclear storage facility and reportedly housed cold-testing facilities to test nuclear warhead designs. Though the IAF remained quiet about the twin strikes, it is believed that the bombings buried the underground nuclear storage facility under a mountain of impact debris and rendered Pakistani nuclear capability toothless.
The unprecedented punishment meted out to the Pakistan Air Force gained more significance after the ceasefire went into effect. Pakistani attempts to exact revenge through drone attacks and a claimed Air Force operation came to nought and highlighted the effectiveness of the IAF's Integrated Air Command and Control System that enabled a comprehensive, round-the-clock defence against heavy drone attacks aimed to saturate air defence environments and damage IAF installations.
Marshaling the Indian Air Force
Significant lessons derived from Operation Sindoor have enabled the IAF to repurpose its offensive and defensive capabilities to mount more damaging assaults in the event of Pakistan upping the ante through sponsored terrorist activities in India. The downing of the AWACS and the attacks on Kirana Hills showed that Pakistani strategic assets are not immune to Indian punitive actions, and Air Chief Marshal AP Singh deserves full credit for the IAF's success.
In the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, Singh credited "the outstanding performance of indigenously developed and integrated weapons which delivered precise and devastating blows deep inside enemy territory," adding that the operation was a shining example of what could be achieved through "meticulous planning, disciplined training and determined execution."
It was his determined insistence on perfection that kickstarted the private sector's involvement in the development of the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft months after Operation Sindoor concluded as the IAF proceeded to conclude the 114 Rafale aircraft deal as a stopgap measure. Under his watch, Tata Advanced Systems also rolled out the first of 40 Airbus C-295 military transport aircraft, marking the first time that a private sector enterprise had manufactured an IAF aircraft.
While his refusal to accept the Tejas Mk-1A fighter, the HJT-36 trainer and the Light Utility Helicopter displayed his adherence to perfection even when he had his back against the wall, the contract issued to HAL in 2025 to manufacture 156 Prachand Light Combat Helicopters for the IAF and the Indian Army showed that he wasted little time in inducting systems that achieved the IAF's strict qualitative requirements.
The Indian Air Force is undergoing rapid transformation and may become one of the world's most powerful air forces in a couple of decades, but its stellar victory during Operation Sindoor has not removed its focus from significant obsolescence impacting its fighter and training squadrons.
It now needs a leader like Singh to efficiently induct new squadrons of Rafale jets, retire hundreds of jets that have served since the 1980s, carefully manage the long-winding Tejas and AMCA programmes, develop advanced defensive capabilities suited to more powerful adversaries like China, and prepare itself for the new era of unmanned aerial warfare.
Every Air chief has had a role to play in keeping the IAF sharp and ready for war and undergo continuous modernisation, but Singh has put into motion a doctrinal shift in how the IAF works with aircraft manufacturers, embraces the private sector, makes efficient use of resources to dominate the battlefield, and leverages Indian technical talent to become a leader in drone and unmanned warfare operations.
It was in 2002 that the Indian government chose Marshal Arjan Singh as the nation's first Marshal of the Air Force, an honour that has not be conferred on any other IAF officer since independence. The rank honoured a leader who became Air chief at just 44 years of age and led the IAF through sheer determination and leadership during the 1965 war that eventually allowed the defending forces to gain the upper hand against a technologically-superior and better-resourced Pakistani Army.
The rank of the Marshal of the Air Force isn't a right. It is the ultimate honour that brings with it the responsibility to lead by example, project an image of a leader who has won difficult wars and transformed the force through sheer willpower, persistence and charisma. If the government sets its mind on finding the next Marshal of the Air Force, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh has the credentials to be the legendary Arjan Singh's able successor.
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